Tenetur itaque dolorum mollitia facere reprehenderit praesentium ullam. Accusantium id et illo ut eum. Dolore rerum qui sit eveniet ut nesciunt quam. Molestias fugiat omnis laborum quam.
How Economists’ Faith in Markets Broke America

How Economists’ Faith in Markets Broke America

A little more than a generation ago, a stealthy revolution swept America. It was a dual changing of the guard: Two tribes, two attitudes, two approaches to a good society were simultaneously displaced by upstart rivals. In the world of business, the manufacturing bosses gave way to Wall Street dealmakers, bent on breaking up their empires. Organization Man,” as the journalist William H. Whyte had christened the corporate archetype in his 1956 book, was ousted by “Transaction Man,” to cite Nicholas Lemann’s latest work of social history. In the world of public policy, lawyers who counted on large institutions to deliver prosperity and social harmony lost influence. In their place rose quantitative thinkers who put their faith in markets. It was The Economists’ Hour, as the title of the New York Times editorial writer Binyamin Appelbaum’s debut book has it.

Together, Lemann and Appelbaum contribute to the second wave of post-2008 commentary. The first postmortems focused narrowly on the global financial crisis, dissecting the distorted incentives, regulatory frailty, and groupthink that caused bankers to blow up the world economy. The new round of analysis broadens the lens, searching out larger political and intellectual wrong turns, an expansion that reflects the morphing of the 2008 crash into a general populist surge. By excavating history, Lemann and Appelbaum remind us that Transaction Man and his economist allies were not always ascendant, and that they won’t necessarily remain so. This frees both writers to ask whether an alternative social contract might be imaginable, or preferable.

 Image of 6b6c269e4

The first section of Lemann’s elegant history conjures up the corporatist order that preceded Transaction Man’s arrival. The story is shaped around Adolf Berle, a lawyer who, with the statistician Gardiner Means, wrote The Modern Corporation and Private Property, a classic study of the concentration of power in the hands of company managers. Before the publication of that masterpiece, in 1932, other authors had drawn attention to what one of them called the “prestidigitation, double shuffling, honey-fugling, hornswaggling, and skullduggery” employed by corporate executives to dupe their supposed masters, the shareholders. Berle went further. He laid out in detail how shareholders, being so dispersed and numerous, could not hope to restrain bosses—indeed, how nobody could do so. Enormous powers to shape society belonged to company chieftains who answered to no one. Hence Berle’s prescription: The government should regulate them.

Berle’s pro-regulatory stance won him an introduction to Franklin D. Roosevelt, and he became an influential New Dealer. But his vision truly triumphed after World War II, when regulation of corporate behavior was supplemented by the rise of labor unions. In the winter of 1945–46, more than 300,000 members of the United Auto Workers union staged a successful strike at General Motors that lasted 113 days, and a few years later, in 1950, the company resolved that further confrontations would be too painful. In what became known as “the Treaty of Detroit,” GM’s bosses granted workers regular cost-of-living pay increases, a measure of job security, health insurance, and a pension—benefits that were almost unheard-of. General Motors had “set itself up as a comprehensive welfare state for its workers,” in Lemann’s succinct formulation.

Berle celebrated the Treaty of Detroit by propounding a pro-corporate liberalism. The corporation had become the “conscience-carrier of twentieth-century American society,” he marveled. Many contemporaries agreed. “The large mass-production plant is our social reality, our representative institution, which has to carry the burden of our dreams,” the rising management theorist Peter Drucker wrote. Anticipating the “end of history” triumphalism of a later era, the sociologist Daniel Bell feted the corporatist order in a book titled The End of Ideology.

Of course, corporatism proved less robust than these writers expected. Berle’s “clash of the titans” liberalism, built on checks and balances among big corporations, big government, and big labor, fell afoul of American individualism. Conservatives railed against big government for stifling freedom. Liberals denounced big corporations for reducing employees to automatons. Both sides came to see big labor as the protector of special interests. In 1965, as Lemann reminds us, the novelist Norman Mailer had one of his characters interrupt a lovemaking session to pluck out his partner’s diaphragm—“a corporate rubbery obstruction.”

Yet the chief threat to Berle’s vision came not from America’s suspicion of concentrated power. It came from economics.

Appelbaum opens his book with the observation that economics was not always the imperial discipline. Roosevelt was delighted to consult lawyers such as Berle, but he dismissed John Maynard Keynes as an impractical “mathematician.” Regulatory agencies were headed by lawyers, and courts dismissed economic evidence as irrelevant. In 1963, President John F. Kennedy’s Treasury secretary made a point of excluding academic economists from a review of the international monetary order, deeming their advice useless. William McChesney Martin, who presided over the Federal Reserve in the 1950s and ’60s, confined economists to the basement.

 Image of 1ca900e07
Little, Brown

Starting in the 1970s, however, economists began to wield extraordinary influence. They persuaded Richard Nixon to abolish the military draft. They brought economics into the courtroom. They took over many of the top posts at regulatory agencies, and they devised cost-benefit tests to ensure that regulations were warranted. To facilitate this testing, economists presumed to set a number on the value of life itself; some of the best passages of Appelbaum’s fine book describe this subtle revolution. Meanwhile, Fed chairmen were expected to have economic credentials. Soon the noneconomists on the Fed staff were languishing in the metaphorical basement.

Read: [How the Fed failed to learn from history]

The rise of economics, Appelbaum writes, “transformed the business of government, the conduct of business, and, as a result, the patterns of everyday life.” It was bound to have a marked effect on Berle’s pro-corporate liberalism. Lemann hangs this part of his story on Michael C. Jensen, an entertainingly impassioned financial economist who reframed attitudes toward the corporation in the mid-’70s.

Jensen agreed with Berle’s starting point: Corporate managers were unaccountable because shareholders could not restrain them. But rather than seeing a remedy in checks exerted by regulators and organized labor, Jensen proposed to overhaul the firm so that ownership and control were reunited. Executives should be rewarded more with stock and less with salary, so that they would think like shareholders and focus on the profits that shareholders wanted. Managers who failed to generate a good return would see their stock prices languish, which would create tempting takeover targets. A market for corporate control would redouble the pressure on bosses to behave like owners. Successful takeovers, in turn, would shift corporations into the hands of single, all-powerful proprietors, capable of overseeing management more effectively than scattered stockholders could. In sum, Jensen’s prescriptions inverted Berle’s. The market could be made to solve the problem of the firm. Government could pull back from regulation.

For ideas to have influence, Lemann observes, “there has to be a confluence between the ideas themselves, the spirit of the times, and the interests of powerful players who find the ideas congenial.” Berle had been lucky that his treatise on the corporation appeared when Roosevelt was launching his run for the presidency. Jensen was equally fortunate in his own way. Shortly after the publication of his research, the invention of junk bonds made hostile takeovers the rage. During the ’80s, more than a quarter of the companies on the Fortune 500 list were targeted. Jensen became the scholar who explained why this unprecedented boardroom bloodbath was good news for America.

And to a considerable extent, the news was good. Shielded from market discipline, the old corporate heads had deployed capital carelessly. They had expanded into new markets for reasons of vanity, squandered money on fancy management dining rooms, and signed labor contracts like the Treaty of Detroit, which—however statesmanlike—stored up liabilities to retirees that would ultimately hobble their companies. From 1977 to 1988, Jensen calculated, American corporations had increased in value by $500 billion as a result of the new market for corporate control. Reengineered and reinvigorated, American business staved off what might have been an existential threat from Japanese competition.

Yet a large cost eluded Jensen’s calculations. The social contract of the Berle era was gone: the unstated assumption of lifetime employment, the promise of retirement benefits, the sense of community and stability and shared purpose that gave millions of lives their meaning. Berle had viewed the corporation as a social and political institution as much as an economic one, and the dismembering of corporations on purely economic grounds was bound to generate fallout that had not been accounted for. Meanwhile, Jensen’s market-centric mind-set permeated finance, enabling opaque risks to build up in banks and other trading houses. As the collapse of Enron and other corporate darlings revealed, a good deal of non-market-related accounting fraud compounded the fragility. Even before the 2008 crash, Jensen disavowed the transactional culture he had helped to legitimize. Holy shit, Jensen remembers saying to himself. Anything can be corrupted.

The wider story of the market-centric worldview provides the meat of Appelbaum’s narrative. It is a tricky tale to tell, because many of the myths of the era fall apart on close inspection. Contrary to common presumption, the economics establishment in the 1990s and 2000s did not believe that markets were perfectly efficient. Rather, influential economists took the pragmatic view that markets would discipline financiers more effectively than regulators could. Alan Greenspan, the Fed chairman who is often painted as the embodiment of the pro-market age, had been preoccupied with the destabilizing inefficiencies in finance since the 1950s. Lawrence Summers, the Harvard economist who became Treasury secretary under Bill Clinton, had contributed to the academic literature on the limits of market efficiency. The fact that such sophisticated people presided over a dangerous buildup in financial risk suggests that something larger was at work than a naive faith in markets.

Appelbaum’s strength is that he generally acknowledges these complexities. He is happy to state at the outset that market-oriented reforms have lifted billions out of poverty, and to recognize that the deregulation that helped undo Berle-ism was not some kind of right-wing plot. In the late ’70s, it was initiated by Democrats such as President Jimmy Carter and Senator Ted Kennedy.

But Appelbaum makes it his mission to highlight instances where the market mind-set went awry. Inequality has grown to unacceptable extremes in highly developed economies. From 1980 to 2010, life expectancy for poor Americans scandalously declined, even as the rich lived longer. Meanwhile, the primacy of economics has not generated faster economic growth. From 1990 until the eve of the financial crisis, U.S. real GDP per person grew by a little under 2 percent a year, less than the 2.5 percent a year in the oil-shocked 1970s.

Read: [Why the poor die young]

As Appelbaum shows, economists have repeatedly made excessive claims for their discipline. In the ’60s, Kennedy’s and Johnson’s advisers thought they had the business cycle tamed. They believed they could prevent recessions by “fine-tuning” tax and spending policies. When this expectation was exposed as hubris, Milton Friedman urged central banks to focus exclusively on the supply of money circulating in the economy. This too was soon discredited. From the ’90s onward, economists oversold the benefits of targeting inflation, forgetting that other perils—the human cost of unemployment, the destabilization wrought by financial bubbles—might well be worse than rising prices. Meanwhile, Greenspan and Summers ducked the political challenge of buffering new kinds of financial trading with regulatory safeguards. To be fair, the Wall Street lobbies presented more of an obstacle to regulation than critics acknowledge. Still, Greenspan and Summers miscalculated.

The upshot was the whirlwind of the past decade: the greatest financial crash in recent memory, and a crisis of legitimacy in the world’s advanced democracies. After decades in which economists’ influence expanded rapidly, the striking thing about the Trump administration and its foreign analogues is that they have largely dispensed with economic advisers. The United States has lived through the era of corporatism, the era of transactionalism, and the economists’ hour. The intellectual marketplace awaits a fresh approach to the structuring of work and the good society.

Lemann and Appelbaum wisely don’t pretend there are easy solutions. The benevolent corporatism of the Treaty of Detroit reflected a world in which American industry faced little foreign competition and new technologies were generally developed by firmly established businesses. By contrast, today’s fierce international competition and disruptive innovation oblige businesses to cut costs or go under. The dilemma is that, even as they compel efficiency, globalization and technological change exacerbate inequality and uncertainty and therefore the need for a compassionate social contract.

Lemann explores one response to this dilemma through the figure of Reid Hoffman, who founded the online professional network LinkedIn and is the third starring character in Lemann’s history of grand conceptions. It is an inspired piece of casting. As a stalwart of Silicon Valley, Hoffman hails from the complex of start-ups that are intent on disrupting what remains of the old-line corporate establishment. At the same time, as the creator of LinkedIn, he represents a purported antidote to the insecurity that results from the disruption.

The promise of online professional networking is that, by building a raft of cyberconnections, workers will safely navigate the rapids of the new economy. Each person’s network, not any one firm, will be the guarantor of employment. Corporations are freed to pursue efficiency as they see fit; individuals nonetheless enjoy some of the security of the old corporatist era, because they have a new tool to help them. LinkedIn thus becomes the psychological center of the world of work—the successor to the corporation. One of Hoffman’s books is titled, rather appropriately, The Start-Up of You. Whereas Transaction Man treated workers as costs on a spreadsheet, Network Man wants to empower them.

One in four American adults says they use LinkedIn, and many recruiters go to the site regularly. But LinkedIn is not a solution to worker insecurity writ large, still less to inequality. On the contrary, a world in which people compete to gather connections may be even less equal than our current one. A few high-octane networkers will attract large followings, while a long tail of pedestrians will have only a handful of buddies. At one point in its evolution, LinkedIn published the size of each user’s network as a spur to add to the total. Later, realizing the anxiety this bred, the site capped the number of connections it published at 500 per member.

Read: [The secret shame of middle-class Americans]

Lemann is under no illusions that online networks are the answer to the search for security and dignity, and he concludes with a different proposal. It is a sort of anticonception conception: Rather than buy in to a single grand vision, societies should prefer a robust contest among interest groups—what Lemann calls pluralism. Borrowing from the forgotten early-20th-century political scientist Arthur Bentley, Lemann defines groups broadly. States and cities are “locality groups,” income categories are “wealth groups,” supporters of a particular politician constitute “personality groups.” People inevitably affiliate themselves with such groups; groups naturally compete to influence the government; and the resulting push and pull, not squabbles among intellectuals about organizing concepts, constitutes the proper stuff of politics. Lemann has a particular respect for the interest groups that fight for Chicago Lawn, the struggling working-class neighborhood that appears at intervals throughout his book, mostly as the victim of some remote transaction. Organizing in one’s interests, he suggests, “is the only effective way to get protection against the inevitable lacunae in somebody else’s big idea.”

Lemann is aware of the risks in this conclusion. He cites the obvious objection: “The flaw in the pluralist heaven is that the heavenly chorus sings with a strong upper-class accent.” In a contest of competing interest groups, the ones with the most money are likely to win. Rich seniors will protect their health benefits at the expense of public housing; the estate tax will vanish, and so will the dream of good preschools for poor children. Appelbaum notes in passing how the beer magnate Joseph Coors helped found the Heritage Foundation to promote a conservative pro-business agenda, and how another businessman, Howard Jarvis, spearheaded the California proposition that reduced property taxes. For those who regard inequality as a challenge, an interest-group free-for-all is a perilous prescription.

Lemann’s pluralism also prompts a deeper reservation. His vision frames politics as a zero-sum affair, dismissing as futile the quest for “a broad, objectively determined meliorist plan that will help everyone.” But this postmodernist pessimism goes too far. Some policies are better than others, and to give up on this truth is to throw away the sharpest sword in the fight against inequality. The government should bankroll good schools because, objectively speaking, good schools will boost both economic growth and social equity. Likewise, competition is generally a force that gets the best out of people, whether they are public-school teachers or tech monopolists. America’s health-care system is ripe for reform because it is both socially unjust and scandalously costly.

At the close of his book, Appelbaum presents a series of persuasive recommendations, confirming that Lemann is wrong to despair of reasoned, technocratic argument. If policy makers want ordinary Americans to appreciate the benefits of open trade, they must ensure that displaced workers have access to training and health care. Because some interest groups are weaker than others, government should correct the double standard by which the power of labor unions is regarded with antipathy but the power of business monopolies is tolerated. Well-heeled professional cartels, such as associations of real-estate agents who extract 6 percent commissions from hapless home sellers, should be eyed with suspicion. Progressives should look for ways to be pro-competition but anti-inequality.

Yet however reasonable Appelbaum’s arguments, readers are also left with a question about the future. Although he sets out to write the story of the economists’ hour—an hour that he thinks ended in 2008—it isn’t so clear that the economists have departed. They may not have the ear of populists, but their resilience shouldn’t be underrated. Indeed, throughout Appelbaum’s narrative, many of the knights who slay the dragons of bad economic ideology are economists themselves. The story of the past generation is more about debates among economists than about economists pitted against laypeople. Perhaps, with a bit of humility and retooling, the economists will have their day again. If they do not come up with the next set of good ideas, it is not obvious who will.

This article appears in the September 2019 print edition with the headline “How the Dismal Science Broke America.”

 Image of qr UVDGV8YU

GOP Sen. Thom Tillis wins reelection against Democrat Cal Cunningham in a competitive US Senate race in North Carolina

GOP Sen. Thom Tillis wins reelection against Democrat Cal Cunningham in a competitive US Senate race in North Carolina


  • GOP Sen. Thom Tillis is projected to have defeated Former State Senator Cal Cunningham in North Carolina, Insider and Decision Desk HQ can report. 
  • Cunningham challenged incumbent Tillis in what was one of the most highly watched Senate races of 2020.
  • Cunningham posted impressive fundraising numbers in his campaign and has led Tillis by substantial margins in recent polls of the state.
  • See the live coverage and full results from the U.S. Senate elections
  • Visit Business Insider’s homepage for more stories.

 GOP Sen. Thom Tillis is projected to have won against former State Senator Cal Cunningham in North Carolina, Insider and Decision Desk HQ can report.

The candidates

Tillis was first elected in the Republican wave of 2014 and ran for a second term in an increasingly competitive state. In the Senate, Tillis serves on the powerful Judiciary and Armed Services Committees. He was previously the speaker of the North Carolina House of Representatives. 

Cunningham, a US Army veteran and former state legislator, is mainly emphasizing increasing access to healthcare, improving education, and combatting climate change in his policy platform. 

He’s also posted impressive fundraising numbers in his campaign so far, a promising sign of his ability to compete in a state with several pricey media markets. In 2020’s second fundraising quarter, Cunningham broke an all-time US Senate quarterly fundraising record in the state with a $7.4 million haul. 

On October 1st, National File published sexual texts of Cunningham’s that appeared to show him cheating on his wife with a public relations strategist. The texts were confirmed to be real by Cunningham’s campaign staff on Friday to The News & Observer.

“I have hurt my family, disappointed my friends, and am deeply sorry. The first step in repairing those relationships is taking complete responsibility, which I do. I ask that my family’s privacy be respected in this personal matter,” Cunningham told The News & Observer.

Cunningham’s scandal, however, did not immediately appear to hurt Cunningham’s standing in the polls. Indeed, he’s led Tillis in every single public poll released since the scandal broke.

As New York Magazine Ben Jacobs put it: “In the era of Trump, violating the Seventh Commandment is no longer an automatic career-killer. Voters may hate the sin, but they’ll cast their ballots for the sinner.”

The stakes

In addition to winning back the White House, regaining control of the US Senate for the first time since 2015 is a top priority for Democrats and would be a major accomplishment towards either delivering on a future president Joe Biden’s policy goals or thwarting President Donald Trump’s second-term agenda.

At the time of the election, the US Senate was made up of 53 Republicans, 45 Democrats, and two independents that caucused with Democrats, meaning that Democrats needed to win back a net total of four seats to have a 51-seat majority (because Biden won, his vice president will also serve as president of the Senate and will be a tie-breaker vote). 

North Carolina voted for President Barack Obama in 2008, but flipped to vote for Mitt Romney in 2012 and Donald Trump in 2016.

Trump was in an increasingly precarious position heading into his re-election, and Democrats attempted to make a play to bring the state back into their coalition and pick up a crucial US Senate seat. 

In a further troubling sign for Tillis’ chances, he performed behind Trump in many of the final polls of the race. A poll of North Carolina conducted by NBC News and Marist College in late October, for example, found Trump earning the support of 46% of likely voters 

Biden led Trump by 1.6 points on average in the presidential race in North Carolina, according to FiveThirtyEight’s polling averages, but Trump ultimately prevailed and won the state in the election.

See Insider’s full guide to the race for the US Senate here

The money race

Cunningham has significantly outraised and outspent Tillis, according to the Center for Responsive Politics.

Cunningham has brought in a total of $47.5 million this cycle, has spent $46.6 million, and has a little over $886,000 in cash on hand, while Tillis has raised $18.9 million, spent $17.5 million, and has $3.5 million in cash on hand this cycle, according to campaign finance records. 

In 2020’s third fundraising quarter, Cunningham outraised Tillis by a more than four-to-one ratio, bringing in a stunning haul of $28.3 million compared to just $6.6 million for Tillis. 

In addition to being a hotly-contested battleground state in the electoral college, North Carolina’s Senate seat is a must-win for Democrats seeking to take back the chamber, and has attracted a record-breaking amount in outspending. 

The Center for Responsive Politics concludes that with a grand total of $233 million spent by both the candidates themselves and outside groups, North Carolina’s Senate race is the most expensive congressional election in US history, breaking a record of $213 million spent in Florida’s 2018 US Senate election. 

What the polling said

Cunningham led Tillis in every single public poll of the race released after June, according to FiveThirtyEight’s polling tracker, and led Tillis by 2.8 percentage points on average in RealClearPolitics’ polling average right before Election Day.

The poll of the race conducted by Emerson College from October 29-31 found Cunningham led Tillis by three points, 50% to 47%, among likely voters. 

A previous survey conducted by CNN/SSRS from October 23-30 also found Cunningham led Tillis by three points, 47% to 44%, among likely voters, while another Marist College/NBC News poll conducted October 25-28 found Cunningham ahead by a much larger margin, 10 points, 53% to 43%. 

See the live coverage and full results from the U.S. presidential election. 

What the experts said

The Cook Political Report and Sabato’s Crystal Ball at the University of Virginia Center for Politics rated this race as a “toss-up” while Inside Elections rated it as “tilts Democratic.”

According to FiveThirtyEight’s US Senate forecast, Cunningham had a 64% chance of defeating Tillis in November. As of late September, Cunningham was expected to receive 50% of the vote, about three percentage points more than Tillis.

Read the original article on Business Insider
 Image of businessinsider?d=yIl2AUoC8zA  Image of businessinsider?i=EF9mbwPCBA0:lKkDcUMyIXQ:F7zBnMyn0Lo  Image of businessinsider?i=EF9mbwPCBA0:lKkDcUMyIXQ:V sGLiPBpWU  Image of businessinsider?d=qj6IDK7rITs  Image of businessinsider?i=EF9mbwPCBA0:lKkDcUMyIXQ:gIN9vFwOqvQ

 Image of EF9mbwPCBA0

The Marine Corps' top officer wants Leathernecks to help take on Russian and Chinese submarines

The Marine Corps' top officer wants Leathernecks to help take on Russian and Chinese submarines

Russia navy submarine
Russian navy diesel-electric submarine Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky in a military parade on Russian Navy Day, July 26, 2020.

  • Marines can contribute to anti-submarine warfare by supporting operations from their expeditionary bases, the Corps’ commandant wrote in a recent essay.
  • Marine Corps Commandant Gen. David Berger has focused on making the Corps more nimble and better able to support distributed naval operations.
  • Supporting the fight against enemy subs, which military leaders are increasingly worried about, can be an extention of that, Berger wrote.
  • Visit Business Insider’s homepage for more stories.

Leathernecks will be getting in on the undersea fight north of Norway and in the Western Pacific, where the US is concerned about increased submarine threats from Russia and China.

Marines will help fight submarines, Commandant Gen. David Berger announced in the November issue of the US Naval Institute’s Proceedings magazine.

With the right equipment, Marines ashore “could harass and potentially neutralize Russian submarines,” Berger said, adding that the same concept could be used in the Western Pacific.

The undersea fight will be so critical in the High North area above Norway and in Asia-Pacific region that “the Marine Corps must be part of it,” he added.

Marine Corps Marines expeditionary advanced basing
US Marines demonstrate expeditionary advanced basing capabilities from Okinawa to Ie Shima and across surrounding waters as part of Exercise Noble Fury, October 7 to 8, 2020.

Expeditionary advanced bases, where small teams of Marines quickly set up temporary spots for land-based operations, would play a big role.

“By offering forward logistics and support, as well as sensor and strike capabilities, Marine expeditionary advanced bases [could make] a significant contribution to undersea warfare campaigns, including holding Chinese and Russian submarines at risk,” Berger said.

Naval leaders have warned about a spike in Russian submarine activity. Satellite data also shows China has increased its nuclear submarine shipyard capacity, USNI News reported last month.

The Navy recently launched a new sub-hunting exercise called Black Widow in the North Atlantic, where Russian undersea activity has been on the rise. Earlier this year, the service also sent at least seven submarines to the Western Pacific, in a big signal to China.

The Marine Corps also just wrapped up an island-hopping exercise in the Pacific, where it rapidly set up long-range fires in one spot before loading back into helicopters and heading to a new area.

Berger is leading the Marine Corps through a massive shift away from land-based missions in the Middle East and a return to naval operations, centered largely around the possibility of future conflict with China. His plan calls for shrinking the size of the force and ditching heavy equipment, such as tanks, to invest in long-range strike capabilities and unmanned systems.

Those are some of the systems Berger says will help Marines track — and potentially take out — enemy subs.

Marine Corps Marines refueling Navy P-8 Poseidon
US Marines conduct ground-training evolutions with a US Navy P-8 Poseidon during Exercise Noble Fury 21, October 9, 2020..

With the right investments, Marines at expeditionary advanced bases in Norway, Iceland and Greenland could create what the commandant referred to as an anti-submarine warfare fence that would bottle Russian submarines in the Norwegian Sea, keeping them out of the North Atlantic.

“The same concept could be applied to the First Island Chain in the western Pacific,” Berger wrote. “Close, confined seas may offer more opportunities for [Marines] to sense and strike Chinese ships and submarines.”

Marine expeditionary advanced bases could also assist Navy aircraft that currently hunt for submarines, such as the P-8 Poseidon, providing “air defense and combat air patrol,” he said. The aircraft could stop off at forward-postured Marine bases until Navy ships move into position, he added.

Ultimately, the sea services need to be prepared for operations against both China and Russia, according to the commandant.

“China is today’s pacing threat,” he said. “[But] Russia’s submarine force is still superior in quality to China’s and much closer geographically to ours.”

Marines must be prepared to support fleet operations wherever they may occur, Berger said.

— Gina Harkins can be reached at gina.harkins@military.com. Follow her on Twitter @ginaaharkins.

Read the original article on Business Insider
 Image of silicon alley insider?i=BSTAo93T8I4:PnfiFYhRkEM:V sGLiPBpWU  Image of silicon alley insider?d=qj6IDK7rITs  Image of silicon alley insider?d=bcOpcFrp8Mo  Image of silicon alley insider?i=BSTAo93T8I4:PnfiFYhRkEM:gIN9vFwOqvQ  Image of silicon alley insider?d=cGdyc7Q 1BI  Image of silicon alley insider?d=QXVau8BzmBE  Image of silicon alley insider?d=yIl2AUoC8zA  Image of silicon alley insider?d=7Q72WNTAKBA

 Image of BSTAo93T8I4

The Republican Party pumped millions into Facebook ads aimed at voter turnout in key battleground states in the week before the election

The Republican Party pumped millions into Facebook ads aimed at voter turnout in key battleground states in the week before the election

Facebook RNC political ads
A handful of examples of ads run by the Republican National Committee on Facebook in the week before the election.

  • In the run up to the 2020 election, Facebook instituted new advertising policies barring any new political ads in the week leading up to Election Day, but that didn’t stop previously approved ads from being boosted and/or altered. 
  • Despite the new rules, the Republican National Committee was able to pour millions into existing campaigns in key battleground states in the last seven days of the race — time that fell under Facebook’s ad ban. 
  • The RNC poured millions into get out the vote and voter registration advertising in the week leading up to the election, Facebook advertising data reported by the MIT Technology Review shows.
  • Moreover, the ads were adjusted up to and including Election Day to target key battleground states like Michigan, Nevada, Georgia, and Pennsylvania.  
  • Visit Business Insider’s homepage for more stories.

In the run up to the 2020 presidential election, Facebook instituted new advertising policies aimed at political campaigns.

One new rule was specifically intended to protect Facebook from moderation issues: No new political ads would be accepted in the seven days leading up to the November 3 election.

Instead of being potentially swamped at the last minute by political ads that required scrutiny before publishing, Facebook gave itself a buffer — but that didn’t stop existing political ad campaigns from boosting their signal and recalibrating their targeting all the way up to Election Day.

Read more: A Biden-Harris administration could mean a crackdown on the advertising and tech industries

The Republican National Committee, for instance, was able to pour millions of additional dollars into its existing get-out-the-vote and voter registration campaigns. Facebook’s ad library data, first spotted by the MIT Technology Review, demonstrates how the RNC not only boosted its campaigns right up to Election Day itself, but also re-targeted its advertising to key battleground states like Michigan, Georgia, and Pennsylvania.

Voter turnout in the 2020 presidential election reached historic highs for both major presidential candidates, with Democratic voters using mail-in and early voting methods in higher numbers than Republican voters, who turned out in higher numbers on November 3.

Facebook has banned political ads indefinitely following the election. 

The company has faced scrutiny from both Democrats and Republicans over its handling of political ads, with members of both parties accusing Facebook of censorship. Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg spent years defending the company’s policies on political advertising. He refused to let Facebook fact-check politicians, and he argued that it was protected free speech.

Got a tip? Contact Business Insider senior correspondent Ben Gilbert via email (bgilbert@businessinsider.com), or Twitter DM (@realbengilbert). We can keep sources anonymous. Use a non-work device to reach out. PR pitches by email only, please.

Read the original article on Business Insider
 Image of businessinsider?d=yIl2AUoC8zA  Image of businessinsider?i=dthfQPMSdVQ:gYwPegUVFDg:F7zBnMyn0Lo  Image of businessinsider?i=dthfQPMSdVQ:gYwPegUVFDg:V sGLiPBpWU  Image of businessinsider?d=qj6IDK7rITs  Image of businessinsider?i=dthfQPMSdVQ:gYwPegUVFDg:gIN9vFwOqvQ

 Image of dthfQPMSdVQ